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We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse
selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or
a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the
insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can
costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit con…rms a
false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We
characterize the e¢cient contracts when this punishment is bounded from
above by a legal restriction.
Then, we do some comparative statics on the e¢cient contracts and on
the agent’s utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal
limit to a defrauder’s punishment. We prove that there exists a unique value
of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type.
Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder’s punishment,
the insurer will e¤ectively audit a low risk report. We also show that this
particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policy-
holder. Therefore, when this probability is su¢ciently high, the nullity of
the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder,
the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the
nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA
and in some European countries.
JEL classi…cation: D82, G2, K42
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Penalties.1 Introduction
In many countries, there is a growing concern about insurance fraud because
its consequent costs are very high. Some estimations corroborate this asser-
tion. Fraudulent claims stand for more than 10% of claims paid in Canada.
The Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) considers that insurance fraud
represents between 5 and 10% of the total amount of indemnities paid in
Europe. In the USA, the annual cost of insurance fraud is estimated to be
above $80 billions. In response to that, not only insurers but also many
di¤erent private and public organizations try to deal with this phenomenon.
First of all, there are investigative …rms, some with very suggestive names
such as “Shadow Chasers” or “Sherlock Investigations”, that provide surveil-
lance and information services for insurance companies in the USA or in the
UK. In other circumstances, an independent agency is created to investi-
gate on behalf of the insurance companies, as it is the case for the French
Agence pour la Lutte contre la Fraude à l’Assurance (ALFA).1 Finally there
are independent nonpro…t organizations of consumers, government agencies
and insurers that are dedicated to combating all forms of insurance fraud
through public information and advocacy. They can be national bodies,
like the (US) Coalition Against Insurance Fraud and the Canadian Coalition
Against Insurance Fraud or even international groups, like the International
Association of Insurance Fraud Agencies.
Although there are several forms of fraud that may appear at di¤erent
stages of an insurance contract, we are only interested in a particular type of
misbehavior that takes place during a policy negotiation. At the underwrit-
ing, the client has to answer usually some questions about his background
information. Moreover, he must communicate truthfully some personal data
that is pertinent for the …nal agreement but which is unknown by the insurer.
It is true that countries’ legislations di¤er in the kind of questions the insurer
has the right to ask and in the type of information the client is obliged to
give. Nevertheless, it is also well documented by practitioners that, at this
stage, many policyholders often lie and misreport their private information.
As they know that insurers decide to cover them or determine their rate upon
those declarations, the clients probably make false declarations in order to
1ALFA is a private institution, created by the Fédération Française des Sociétés
d’Assurance in 1985 and …nanced by participation fees paid by a pool of insurance com-
panies. ALFA conducts investigations of suspicious cases that are submitted by these
insurers.
1be e¤ectively covered or to pay lower premiums. We can mention two exam-
ples of these attitudes: failing to report an accurate medical history when
applying for health insurance and, in automobile insurance, declaring that
the usual driver is the middle-aged car’s owner while, in fact, it will be his
young son.
These misrepresentations seem to occur in many branches of the insurance
industry. A recent study published by the (US) Coalition Against Insurance
Fraud (1997) shows that 63% of the interviewed said that application fraud is
very common or fairly common. In another survey conducted by the Florida
Insurance Research Center (1991), one third of the interviewed declared that
telling lies at the underwriting was acceptable in automobile insurance. Al-
though these …gures are not an objective measure of how much widespread
this particular type of fraud is, they show the potential magnitude of this
problem. In fact, for the insurance industry, it is far from being neglige-
able. The French agency ALFA found that, in 173 fraudulent cases of car
accidents, 75 contracts presented at least one false declaration related to the
risk. These false declarations were principally about the driver’s identity, its
antecedents and the car’s use (ALFA, 1999). As stressed by an important
member of the Association of British Insurers
“There is a realization that if even a tiny percentage of policy-
holders are willing to tell lies, or not disclose relevant information
when they take out their policy, it does present the industry with
a multi-million pound problem”2
If insurers can audit these declarations, they may discover if they were
fraudulent. In the USA and in some European countries, insurance compa-
nies are allowed to punish the guilty policyholders. But this possibility is
strongly regulated by law. In France, the Insurance Code sets precisely the
penalties: in case of damage, policyholders who defraud intentionally at the
underwriting are not covered and the insurer is allowed to keep the premium
(Code des Assurances, Article L.113-8). The Californian legislation is, on
the one hand, tougher than the French because unintentional concealment of
pertinent information also entitles the insurer to rescind the contract (Cali-
fornia Insurance Code, Chapter 3, Article 1, Section 331). But on the other
hand, it does not specify anything concerning the premium’s return. In the
State of New York, the “Insurance Frauds Prevention Act” also includes, for
2Lloyd’s List Insurance Day, October 16, 1993; quoted from Picard (1996).
2misrepresentations of information at the underwriting of the contract, the
possibility of “a civil penalty not to exceed …ve thousand dollars”, in addi-
tion to any other speci…ed criminal liability (New York State Consolidated
Laws, Chapter 28, Article 4, Section 404). The …rst objective of this paper
is to characterize the e¢cient insurance contracts when policyholders that
have been found misreporting their personal characteristics can be penalized
but below a given exogenous level.
By imposing a limit to a defrauder’s sanction, the law restraints the set
of contracts that can be o¤ered. Thus insurers’ pro…ts and policyholders’
rents depend implicitly on the legal framework dealing with insurance fraud.
But laws come either directly from the choice of individuals in the case of
a referendum for a proposition of law or indirectly, via a voted representa-
tive, from lobbies’ activities and voting. Therefore, if insurers (policyholders)
can participate in some way in the legal framework’s design concerning in-
surance fraud, they will try to …x a punishment limitation that maximizes
their expected pro…t (utility). In the USA, both at the federal and at the
state level, legislation that provides new and increased criminal and civil
penalties has been enacted. In 1991, the Bill 3171 was introduced by the
House of Representatives to amend the US Code so that fraud against insur-
ance companies will be subject to strong federal criminal and civil penalties.
Many states followed that intent. An weekly magazine for insurers reported
that a bill criminalizing some insurance rip-o¤s was under study in Michigan
Legislature.3 Although the insurance industry has been very active in pro-
moting these legal changes, it seems di¢cult to explain the strong political
support for this hardness of the American legislation only by the action of
the insurers’ lobby. So the second objective of this paper is to show that
not only insurers, which would be natural, but also policyholders, specially
those that may be tempted to misreport, do have preferences for high levels
of punishment to impose to defrauders.
To deal with these two issues in the simplest way, we present a Principal-
Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. Our basic
setting is similar to the Stiglitz (1977) framework. The insurer is unable to
distinguish between two di¤erent types of an agent, namely his low or high
3National Underwriter, Property & Casualty/Risk & Bene…ts Management, May 15,
1995. It is interesting to observe that, to support the need for passage of such bill, the
article cited a study conducted by the Alliance of American Insurers, illustrating how
much widespread falsi…cations of auto insurance applications were. This misbehavior is
exactly the kind of insurance fraud that we study in this paper.
3probability of su¤ering a damage after an accident. We extend the Stiglitz’s
model in two directions. First of all, we allow the insurer to request his client
to declare his risk at the underwriting stage. Then we assume that the insurer
has the possibility to audit this declaration. Like many other contributions
that have dealt with costly-state veri…cation (for example, Townsend (1979),
Baron and Besanko (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel
(1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989)), we assume that audit is costly but
perfect because, if it is performed, it reveals the type of the agent. When
the insurer is allowed by law, he can penalize the policyholder that has mis-
reported. But the punishment can not exceed a given exogenous legal limit.
The fact that the agent’s type can be observable after an audit and the result
is veri…able allows the insurer to contract upon the policyholder’s declaration
and the observation of its truthfulness. As we assume that the insurer has
perfect commitment, he includes in the contract the probability of audit and
the penalty to impose to a defrauder.
Many articles have studied the impact of misreports in insurance mar-
kets. But models with announcements of types at the underwriting stage
combined with investigation and veri…cation of these announcements have
not been applied to the analysis of insurance fraud.4 To our knowledge, the
only exceptions are the contributions by Doherty and Jung (1993) and Dixit
(2000). These papers examine the equilibrium in competitive insurance mar-
kets with adverse selection on the risk of damage. Doherty and Jung assume
that each agent’s type characterizes the support and the average of the dis-
tribution of potential losses. Dixit adopts the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
framework, where agents di¤er in their probabilities of su¤ering an accident.
Although Doherty and Jung and Dixit treat false declarations of risk at
the application stage as an adverse selection problem, we prefer to refer to this
kind of misbehavior as “fraud”. The reason for this quali…cation is that our
model combines the following realistic features: the existence of a common
language between the insurer and the policyholder so they can communicate,
the legal possibility for the insurer to discriminate between di¤erent types
by asking the agent to declare his private information, the legal obligation
of truthfulness for this declaration (or, equivalently, the quali…cation of a
4Most of the articles that analyze insurance fraud adopt an ex-post approach: poli-
cyholders either …ll in claims for inexistent accidents or commit buildup by in‡ating the
amount of the damage associated with a valid claim. See among others Picard (1996),
Bond and Crocker (1997), Crocker and Morgan (1998), Fagart and Picard (1999) and
Picard (1999).
4misreport as a civil fault or a crime) and …nally the existence of an audit
technology that enables the insurer to verify the report. When legal restric-
tions prohibit insurers from using objective but non-observable variables to
classify risks, they are not allowed to qualify a policyholder that omits to
declare such variable as a “defrauder”.
We …nd that e¢cient contracts have the same coverage properties than
the Stiglitz’s equilibrium. A high risk agent receives a full insurance contract
whereas a low risk policyholder is partially insured. Although under the
Stiglitz’s framework a separating equilibrium always exists, low risk types
can be excluded from the market if their proportion is relatively low. This
is not the case in our model. As the insurer has the possibility to audit
and punish a defrauder, he is always able to cover both types of agents.
Following the well-known Becker’s (1968) argument, the insurer will penalize
a defrauder at the maximum legal level. Concerning his audit strategy, our
result goes in the same direction than the intuitions that appear in Border
and Sobel and in Mookherjee and Png, although their setting is di¤erent
to ours. As only the high risk agent has incentives to mimic the low risk
policyholder, only a low risk report will be audited. Finally, we show that
di¤erent cases of e¢cient contracts arise. They depend crucially on the legal
limit to punishments.
In the second part of the article, we do some comparative statics on the
e¢cient contracts and on the agent’s rent. Our most important result is
the existence of a unique level of the legal limit for a defrauder’s punishment
that maximizes the high risk type’s expected utility. This particular level will
imply afterwards a punishment that will be neither negligeable nor in…nite.
This result seems striking because one could expect that what defrauders
want is precisely not to be punished. But if potential defrauders have the
power to design a legal framework that avoids punishments, the insurer will
contractually react. He will not audit and, moreover, he will distort too
much the contract o¤ered to a low risk client, which is at the detrimental
of the other type. This level of the legal limit for a defrauder’s punishment
is increasing in the probability that the agent is a high risk one. When
this probability is su¢ciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough.
From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder
sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a
common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European
countries. We believe that our results could serve as an explanation for the
strong political support for some recent changes in the American legislation
5concerning insurance fraud.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. Then we analyze the benchmark, where no audit is possible. Next,
we characterize the di¤erent contracts that arise in equilibrium when the
insurer audits but the penalties he can impose are bounded from above by
law. Then we discuss the existence of an optimal level of punishment that the
insurer can impose to defrauders. In the conclusion, we summarize the main
results of the paper and we comment about future research on the political
economy of anti-fraud legislation in insurance markets. All proofs are shown
in the Appendix.
2 The model
The policyholder is a risk-averse agent which has an initial wealth !: With
a strictly positive probability ¼; he may have an accident. In that case, he
su¤ers a loss ` < !: He has a von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function
u that veri…es the usual properties of monotonicity and strict concavity. Let
uNA
0 = u(!) and uA
0 = u(!¡`) be the agent’s utilities in the states of Nature
“no accident” (NA) and “accident” (A) respectively.
The agent can be of two di¤erent types j 2 J = fH;Lg. He can face a
high risk (H) or a low risk (L) of having the accident, implying that ¼H > ¼L.
Let Uj ´ (1 ¡ ¼j)uNA
0 + ¼juA
0 be the reservation level of expected utility of
an agent of type j. The agent knows privately his type. The probability that
the agent is low risk is denoted by ¹ 2 (0;1):
The insurer is risk-neutral. He is completely uninformed about the
agent’s type but knows the probability ¹; together with the value of ! and `.
At the beginning of the contracting stage, he requests the client to declare his
risk. We denote by e j 2 fL;Hg this announcement. This formalization is a
reduced form of a more sophisticated model. In such model, the policyholder
declares some personal and objective characteristics (like age, domicile or
medical record) that are unobservable for the insurer. Upon this declaration,
the insurer estimates the risk of loss. Our assumption about the policyholder’s
knowledge of his probability of accident is equivalent to say that he knows
the insurer’s technology of estimation of the risk and therefore he is also
able to estimate his own risk. In fact, this is not so unrealistic. Many US
States Insurance Departments explain to consumers why insurers take into
account those mentioned factors to consider applications for coverage. Their
6consumer publicly provided guides explicitly describe the reason: insurers’
statistical data show correlation between those factors and the probability of
having an accident (see, for example, Kansas Insurance Department (2000)).
The insurer observes if the accident has e¤ectively occurred. After that,
he can audit the reported type with probability °.5 The audit is perfect in
the sense that, if it is done, it enables the insurer to discover the agent’s
type. We assume that the insurance company has an audit sector with …xed
capacity and decreasing marginal productivity. Therefore we formalize his
expected audit cost as a strictly increasing and convex function c(°) that
veri…es the following properties
c(0) = 0; c
0(0) = 0 and lim
°!° c(°) = +1
where ° is the highest frequency of audit attainable, given the technology
of inspection available to the insurer. Instead of using transfers as control
variables (like in most contributions in insurance theory), we adopt a dual
approach as Grossman and Hart (1983) did. In order to solve the model in
the utility space, we have to de…ne the strictly increasing and convex function
v ´ u¡1( ): In this setting, an insurance contract C has the following shape
C =
n




e j ;°e j;uD
e j
´ o
After an announcement of the risk, the insurer o¤ers the policy, indicating
that he commits to leave to his client a level of utility in each …nal state and
to a probability of audit.6 We assume total commitment for this contract
and we de…ne
² uNA: the utility when the agent accepts the contract and has no acci-
dent,
² uA: the utility when the agent takes the contract and has an accident,
² uD: the utility to be left to a defrauder after the audit founds a misre-
port.
5For the sake of simplicity, we rule out the possibility of audit before the accident.
Although this option could in principle enrich the analysis of the e¢cient contract o¤ered
by the insurer, it would not change qualitatively the main result of this article, namely
the fact that a defrauder wants a punishment if he is caught.
6It is easy to show that, in this framework, the insurer never gains by o¤ering to the
client a contract where the latter is not obliged to announce his risk.
7Institutional constraints: The insurer is prevented from rewarding the
policyholder after an audit has con…rmed his report. Hence, in that case, the
agent’s utility is the same than with no audit. Moreover the insurer can not
over-insure the client so uNA ¸ uA:7 Finally there is also a legal lower-bound
u on the level of utility to be left to the client in any …nal state.
3 The e¢cient contracts
In this section, we analyze the policies o¤ered to the agent. For any given
value of u; the e¢cient contract maximizes the insurer’s expected pro…t. First
of all, to have a benchmark for comparison, we study the situation when the
insurer can not audit. Then we look at a more general framework, where we
consider this last possibility and we include punishments for defrauders.
3.1 The e¢cient contracts without audit
As the insurer is unable to audit, we do not have to consider the legal lower-
bound u. This framework corresponds to the Stiglitz (1977) model. The most
important results of his model are gathered in the next proposition. Let Uj
be the expected utility of an agent of type j and uj be the utility when the
policyholder gets a full-insurance contract that sets uNA
j = uA
j . From now
on, the hats will characterize the Stiglitz’s solutions.
Proposition 1 The insurer o¤ers two di¤erent incentive-compatible con-
tracts. The high risk agent always receives a full insurance contract. But
the equilibrium depends upon the probability of a low risk agent ¹: There
exists a threshold ^ ¹ such that the o¤ered contracts are as follows:
² 8¹ < ^ ¹; ^ uNA
L > uNA
0 ; ^ uA
L < uA
0 and ^ uH = U
H
² 8¹ ¸ ^ ¹; uNA
0 > ^ uNA
L > ^ uA
L > uA
0 ; UL = U
L and ^ uH > U
H
Although a high risk agent has incentives to declare to be a low risk,
the insurer never o¤ers pooling contracts because he gains with the discrim-
ination.8 As the high risk policyholder have the highest willingness to be
7These two institutional constraints are introduce to deal with ex-post moral hazard
problems, either from the policyholders (setting excessive number of claims to obtain the
reward) or from the insurer (declaring he has not seen the accident).
8The only pooling equilibrium arises when ¹ ! 1: In that case, the insurer o¤ers a
unique contract, setting ^ uH = ^ uNA
L = ^ uA
L = U
L:
8covered, he always gets a full insurance contract. But, in order to deal with
incentive-compatibility, the insurer has to distort the contract o¤ered to a
low risk agent. Therefore, as ^ uNA
L > ^ uA
L; the latter is only partially insured.
When the probability ¹ is below the threshold ^ ¹, the complement proba-
bility of a high risk individual is relatively large. The insurer has to propose
to the low risk agent a contract so distorted that in fact it will not be ac-
cepted. So this type of agent is no longer covered against the loss. By doing
so, the insurer is able to extract all high risk policyholder’s informational
rent but at the cost of obtaining positive pro…ts only for one type of agent.
When the probability ¹ is above the threshold ^ ¹, the insurer covers both
type of agents by discriminating between them. The low risk gets a partial
insurance contract that sets him to his reservation level of expected utility
U
L. The other agent receives a strictly positive informational rent ^ uH > U
H:
In this case, the …nal utilities ^ uj depend upon the probability of the low risk
agent ¹: The utilities b uA
L and b uH are increasing functions of ¹ because, as
this probability increases, the insurer can reduce the distortions on the low
risk’s contract, distortions with respect to the full-insurance contract.
3.2 The e¢cient contracts with audit and penalties
Now we characterize the contracts o¤ered by the insurer when he audits
but also faces the legal lower-bound u. Instead of solving directly the in-
surer’s optimization problem, we simplify it through a sequence of lemmas
and propositions. First of all, we prove an important intermediary result,
which states the necessity of penalizing a defrauder, in terms of utility, to
audit with strictly positive probability.
Lemma 1 If an e¢cient contract sets °e j > 0 then it must verify uD
e j · uA
e j :
The insurer does not audit if he has to leave to a defrauder a higher
utility than to an agent who has truthfully reported his type. The role of an
audit, combined with a punishment, is to reduce the incentives to misreport.
But the insurer can not threaten a defrauder with this possibility if for the
latter there is no real loss, in terms of utility, between truthful reporting
and misreporting. Therefore, in that case, it is not worth for the insurer
to audit because he will bear the expected cost. We call the di¤erence in
utility uA
e j ¡ uD
e j a “punishment”. This is a necessary condition to threaten a
defrauder with the possibility of an audit and therefore the discovery of his
9type. As we want to restrict our analysis to the punishment’s side, we focus
our attention on pairs of parametric values (u;¹) such that the lower-bound
veri…es u · ^ uA
L(¹):9 Next we prove the following result.
Proposition 2 The insurer prefers contracts such that each type of agent
reports truthfully.
Although our model is theoretically similar to Border and Sobel (1987),
we impose more restrictions than them, specially the fact that truthful re-
ports can not be rewarded. So we can not directly apply their modi…ed
version of the Revelation Principle, set in the …rst proposition of their arti-
cle. Nevertheless we prove that the insurer does not gain by o¤ering contracts
that induce a misreport in equilibrium.10 Therefore, the e¢cient contracts
are incentive-compatible and all their components are contingent on the an-
nouncement of the type j. These contracts solve the following program
P
8
> > > > > <




8 j Uj ¸ Uj IR(j)





















is the insurer’s expected pro…t,
Uj ´ (1 ¡ ¼j)uNA
j + ¼juA
j
9Recall that ^ uA
L is the Stiglitz’s level of utility of a low risk agent that has su¤ered an
accident but is covered. As we mentioned before, this value depends on the probability of
a low risk agent ¹:
10We could have considered more general mechanisms. For example, after an announce-




e j ;°e j;uD
e j
´
, the insurer can o¤er a
menu of contracts to the policyholder. But our result also holds in this more general case.
10is the expected utility of a type j policyholder that announces truthfully his
type and
Uj0j ´ (1 ¡ ¼j)uNA
j0 + ¼j[°j0uD
j0 + (1 ¡ °j0)uA
j0] j0 6= j
is his expected utility if he misreports. Let IR(j); IC(j) and NOI(j) be
the participation constraint, the incentive-compatibility constraint and the
no-over insurance constraint for each type. A contract that veri…es all these
constraints is called “feasible”. Next we show a result that goes in the sense
of Becker’s (1968) well-known proposition.
Lemma 2 If an e¢cient contract sets a strictly positive probability of audit
°
j > 0; the level of utility to be left to a defrauder uD
j is equal to the minimum
legal level u.
There is no gain for not penalizing at the maximum a defrauder since, by
Proposition 2, this will never happen in equilibrium. Although this model
does not give rise to fraud in equilibrium, this is an out-of-equilibrium pos-
sibility whose outcome depends crucially on the minimum legal level u: And
in fact it has to be considered by the insurer at the contract design stage.
Next we show that, for a high risk agent, his contract does not qualitatively
di¤er from the Stiglitz’s contract.
Lemma 3 A high risk policyholder is always fully insured.
As a high risk agent has the highest willingness to be fully covered, the
insurer maximizes his pro…ts by given him a full-insurance contract. The next
lemma states that, in equilibrium, only one type of agent has an incentive to
misreport.
Lemma 4 An e¢cient contract veri…es that the incentive-compatibility con-
straint IC(L) is slack, the incentive-compatibility constraint IC(H) binds
and a high risk individual is never audited.
Since the low risk type has no incentives to defraud, the audit probability
for an agent that declares to be of a high risk can be set equal to zero. But the
opposite obviously does not hold. In Border and Sobel’s terminology, a high
risk policyholder “is attracted by” a low risk type and thus has incentives
to defraud. Therefore it may be optimal to audit the low risk type with a
11positive probability, set at the lowest level that is compatible with a high risk
individual being indi¤erent between the two contracts. A similar result was
noted by Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and Png (1989). Applying
the previous lemmas, we can also show another result.
Lemma 5 An e¢cient contract veri…es that the participation constraint IR(L)
binds.
The insurer maximizes his pro…t by extracting all rents from a low risk
individual. This type of agent is indi¤erent between buying the contract or
not. We assume that, if the contract implies a non-negative coverage of the
risk, a low risk individual will take it. Finally we can exhibit some conditions
under which the no-over insurance constraint NOI(L) is slack.
Lemma 6 If, in equilibrium, °
L < ¿ ´
4¼
¼H(1¡¼L); the low risk policyholder
is partially insured.
In fact, the insurer faces an incentive problem that can be solved in two
di¤erent ways. On the one hand, when the technology of audit is relatively
ine¢cient so that the expected cost of audit increases very fast with respect
to the probability °, the insurer uses this option with a low probability.
So, to relax the binding incentive-compatibility constraint IC(H); he o¤ers
a partial-insurance contract to a low risk agent. This has a second-order
negative e¤ect on the insurer’s expected pro…t but the consequent reduction
in the high risk utility uH has a …rst-order positive e¤ect. On the other hand,
when the technology of audit is very e¢cient, the insurer can combat fraud
by auditing more frequently. If this is the case, he does not need to distort
too much the contract o¤ered to a low risk policyholder. In fact, it may be
optimal to set, for a low risk agent, uA
L > uNA
L . As this is not allowed by
institutional constraints, in that case the insurer has to o¤er a full-insurance
contract for this type of client. As most of the contributions to insurance
fraud consider that audit has a linear expected cost, they can not show the
impact of the marginal cost on the distortions for low risk agents. From now
on, we assume that the audit technology is very ine¢cient and so costly that,
at the optimum, °
L < ¿: This is possible if the upper bound ° is below ¿:
Using the previous results, we can rewrite the initial problem P as follows:
128
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uH = ULH IC(H)
°
L ¸ 0
The shape of the e¢cient contracts depend on the di¤erent values of the
probability ¹ and the minimum level of utility u that the insurer is obliged
to leave to a defrauder. Three di¤erent types of contracts may arise in
equilibrium. They are characterized as follows:
² Case A: °




0 and uH > U
H
² Case B: °




0 and uH = U
H
² Case C: °
L = 0; uH ¸ U
H and uNA
L ¸ uA
L (the Stiglitz solution).
In cases A and B the insurer covers both types of agent. But in the second
case, he is also able to extract all the surplus of a high risk individual. This
last con…guration was not achievable in the Stiglitz framework. But here
the audit combined with a penalty enables the insurer to relax the binding
incentive-compatibility constraint IC(H): Thus the insurer can increase the
coverage of a low risk agent. In the next …gure we show the parametric
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Figure 1: The e¢cient contracts
In order to get an intuition of the frontiers, recall that we have restricted
u to verify u · b uA
L(¹): When u = b uA
L; it is not worth for the insurer to audit.
Hence he sets the Stiglitz solution, which is drawn as a kinky frontier. First of
all, let ¹ > b ¹: Departing from the Stiglitz’s case, the insurer audits only when
u < b uA
L: But he has to leave a strictly positive rent to a high risk policyholder.
When u decreases and attains the frontier denoted by to e ¹(u), the insurer is
able to extract all high risk agent’s rent because the punishment for a fraud
becomes tougher. When u · uA
0 and ¹ · b ¹; although the insurer can limit
or extract a high risk’s rent, he is also able to cover a low risk agent. The
reason is that, as the penalty is high in that parametric region, the threat
of audit relaxes the e¢ciency-rent trade-o¤. Finally, when the probability of
facing a low risk agent is so low that ¹ < (e ¹)Min, the insurer cannot leave
any positive rent to a high risk agent. Although in the left inferior part of
the …gure the legal lower-bound u can be very low, the probability of having
to leave such rent is so high that the trade-o¤ goes in the direction to set
this type of agent to its reservation level of expected utility U
H.
144 The defrauders’ most preferred legal limit
to punishments
The insurer’s expected pro…t cannot decrease when the legal limit u decreases
because the set of feasible contracts becomes larger. The common sense
would say the opposite for the agent: his expected utility cannot decrease
when u increases, specially if he is a high risk type prone to defraud. In fact,
due to the second-best nature of our model, this is not true. The policyholder
has a most preferred value for the legal limit u and this particular value is not
maximal. As we are only interested on fraud and on the punishment’s side
of the model, we only consider values of u that are below b uA
L. By doing that,
we do not want to take into account restrictions to the insurer’s behavior if




¯ where ¯ is the coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion of
the underlying (CARA) utility function u
² c(°) = c
°2
2 .
A low risk individual always obtains the same level of expected utility
because his individual rationality constraint binds. Therefore he is indi¤erent
between any minimal level of utility u. But this is not the case for a high risk
policyholder. Under the Case A and the Stiglitz solution, he obtains strictly
positive informational rents that are not a priori easy to compare. In fact,
we are able to show the following result, which is the most important of this
paper.
Proposition 3 When the probability of facing a low risk agent is above
(e ¹)Min and the derivative of the expected marginal cost exceeds b c, there exists
an unique level of minimal utility to leave to a defrauder such that, facing
this legal limit,
² the insurer audits,
² the potential high risk defrauder would be punished if he misreports but
his expected utility is nevertheless maximal.
15As we can see in Figure 1, a high risk policyholder may obtain a strictly
positive rent only when ¹ ¸ (e ¹)Min : When the probability of facing this
type of agent is too important because 1 ¡ ¹ ¸ 1 ¡ (e ¹)Min, it is optimal
for the insurer to leave him with his reservation level of expected utility U
H.
But when this probability (1 ¡ ¹) is not to high, the insurer faces a trade-o¤
between e¢ciency and rent extraction. Although this result about the value
u¤ and its implications in terms of punishment for a potential defrauder seems
counter-intuitive, its explanation can be seen in a constructive way, departing
from a situation where, for a given ¹ > b ¹; the minimal level of utility u = b uA
L:
We know that, in that case, the insurer does not audit and sets the Stiglitz’s
solution. Let u slightly decrease. Facing the new legal limit, it is optimal
for the insurer to start auditing the low risk agent in order to reduce the
other type’s incentives to fraud. Although audit is costly, it enables the
insurer to attenuate the distortion of the Stiglitz’s partial insurance contract
o¤ered to the low risk policyholder at the cost of an increase in the rent of
the high risk agent that is lower than when the audit was not possible. So,
starting from the Stiglitz’s values b uNA
L and b uA
L, the insurer decreases uNA
L and
increases uA
L: The e¢ciency gains are high enough to o¤set an increase in uH:
If u decreases more, the e¢ciency of the audit increases because the loss in
utility for a defrauder (uA
L ¡ u) increases, which relaxes more the incentive-
compatibility constraint of the high risk type. Thus, the marginal cost of
satisfying this constraint IC(H) decreases. Therefore the insurer obtains
more e¢ciency gains and can allow a new increase in uH: But if u continues
to decrease, it attains a value denoted by u¤ where the e¢ciency gains are
lower than the incentive gains. Therefore the insurer starts to extract the
rent from the high risk agent. His expected utility attains a maximum level
u¤
H and then decreases. We call the value u¤ the high risk’s optimal level of
minimal utility to leave to an audited defrauder.
In order to completely characterize the set of values u¤, we do some
comparative statics: We prove the following result, which characterizes the
mentioned set.
Proposition 4 When the probability of facing a high risk policyholder in-
creases, his optimal level of minimal utility to be left to an audited defrauder
u¤ decreases and the punishment (uA
L ¡ u¤) increases.
In the Stiglitz’s model, when the proportion of high risk policyholders in
the population becomes larger, the insurer faces an increasing problem of po-
tential fraud because more people want to misreport. As a consequence, the
16distortions in the contract o¤ered to the low risk agents are more important
because the trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and rent extraction is more favorable
to the second goal. In our setting, departing from the Stiglitz’s solution, the
higher is the probability of facing a high risk agent, the greater are the gains
from auditing a low risk policyholder. There are two reasons for that. First
of all, when it is more likely to face a high risk agent, there are more e¢ciency
gains on the other type from relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint
IC(H) via an audit. Second, as this audit is done only for a low risk report,
ceteris paribus it is less frequent and therefore it costs less. Hence the in-
surer can audit more. Recall that, for a given ¹, when u departs from b uA
L;
the e¢ciency of the audit increases. Therefore these two e¤ects can reinforce
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Figure 2: The optimal level u¤
By simple observation, we can see another result which is linked to some
observed legal punishments.
17Proposition 5 When the probability of facing a high risk agent is relatively
high, the optimal level of minimal utility u¤ is below the utility that corre-
sponds to the nullity of the contract.
We know that the locus u¤ starts at the point where u¤ = b uA
L = U
L
and then decreases with ¹; converging to the point where u¤ = (u)Min :
Therefore there must exist a value ¹1 > (e ¹)Min such that u¤(¹1) = uA
0 :
So, when the likelihood of facing a high risk policyholder is su¢ciently high
and above ¹1, this type of agent has an optimal u¤ lower than uA
0 . Recall
that this is the utility of a non-insured agent that has an accident. But
uA
0 is also the level of utility that an insured gets if the company rescinds
the contract. This is a widespread punishment for the kind of fraud that
we analyzed in this paper. So when the probability of facing a high risk
agent is above ¹1, from his personal point of view, the law should allow
harder punishments than the nullity of his contract. As we mentioned in the
Introduction, we do observe some variability in the minimal level of utilities
u between di¤erent legislations. In some countries, the legal limit is set
exclusively by the nullity of the contract while, in others, there is also a
monetary …ne for false declarations at the underwriting stage.
Finally we compare the optimal level of minimal utility u¤ to the social
optimum. In order to do that, we adopt an utilitarian approach. We de…ne
the social welfare W as the sum of the pro…t of the insurer and the expected
utilities of both types of policyholders. It is straightforward to prove the last
proposition of this paper.
Proposition 6 The minimal level of utility u¤ is not socially optimal. An
utilitarian social authority should impose a lower legal limit uW.
Although the level of utility u¤ represents a real punishment for a high
risk agent in terms of loss of utility, this level is above the legal limit uW
that should be imposed by an utilitarian social planner. The reason is that
u¤ does not completely internalize the insurer’s expected pro…t as uW does.
The social welfare would be higher with lower levels of minimal utility to set
to defrauders, as the Beckerian approach points out.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse
selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or
18a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the
insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can
costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit con…rms a
false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We
characterized the e¢cient contracts when this punishment is bounded from
above by a legal restriction. These contracts are separating and imply, on the
one hand, that a high risk agent is fully insured and may receive a positive
informational rent. On the other hand, a low risk one is always partially
insured at his reservation level of expected utility. These contracts include
a probability of audit but only for a low risk report. Concerning potential
fraud, they also specify that the punishment for a defrauder is set at the legal
maximum.
Then, we did some comparative statics on the e¢cient contracts and
on the agent’s utility. The most important result of this paper concerns
the legal limit to a defrauder’s punishment. We prove that there exists a
unique value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high
risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder’s
punishment, the insurer will e¤ectively audit a low risk report. We also show
that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk
policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is su¢ciently high, the nullity
of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder,
the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the
nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA
and in some European countries.
Our framework seems too restrictive to apply for empirical issues and
more policy oriented considerations because two criticisms can be made. The
…rst concerns the Principal-Agent framework because it yields to a monop-
olistic representation of the insurance market. We agree that it is di¢cult
to argue that, either in the USA or in Europe, the most important branches
of the insurance industry are monopolies. Nevertheless, our model explains
better than the perfect competition setting, some stylized facts specially the
insurance industry’s lobby for legal changes towards the criminalization of
insurance fraud. In a competitive insurance market model, the companies
are indi¤erent between any level of legal limit for punishments because no
matter its value, they do not earn positive pro…ts. So, as lobby is costly,
in such model it is not worth for insurers to engage in this legislative ac-
tivity. But, as this was certainly not the case at least in the USA, we can
doubt about the validity of the competitive insurance market model for our
19purposes. The second criticism focuses on another result that contradicts
many practitioners observation, namely that our model does not give rise to
fraud in equilibrium. In a more complicated framework where, for example,
the insurer could not commit to the probability of audit, it has been shown
elsewhere that it is not optimal for the latter to punish defrauders at the
maximum legal level. Thus fraud occurs in equilibrium. Nevertheless, also
in that case, the most important result of our paper would remain qualita-
tively unaltered. Defrauders will still have an optimal level of legal limit for
punishments that will yield to non-negligeable sanctions for them, although
lower than the one that we found here.
In spite of these criticisms, we believe that our model and its results
can help to answer the following question: to what extent a change in the
legislation towards more punishment for insurance defrauders will receive the
approval of a majority? In that sense, we think that our approach can be
generalized and pursued towards a political economy theory of anti-fraud
legislation in insurance markets. In that perspective, our model could be
extended to consider restrictions in other components of the insurance policy,
as it was the case for the approval of the polemic Proposition 103 in California
in 1988. Also we do not consider any externality problem here. In that case,
low risk agents would take in account that they may have an accident with
a defrauder which …nally will not be covered. So, at the moment to vote
for the limit to punishments, they will probably choose lower sanctions than
the nullity of the contract. These may be some promising theoretical lines of
research.
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22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We rewrite the Stiglitz’s model in the utility space, having de…ned the func-
tion v ´ u¡1( ): The Lagrangian of the reduced problem of this model is as
follows:11
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where ¸1 and ¸2 are the multipliers associated to the equality constraints
and ®1; to the inequality one. The …rst-order conditions are
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= 0 ®1 ¸ 0 CSC(1)
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L + ¼Lb uA
L = U
L IR(L)
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L + ¼Hb uA
L = uH IC(H)
>From FOC(2) and FOC(3), we …nd
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where 4¼ ´ ¼H ¡ ¼L: Also from FOC(1)
®1 = (1 ¡ ¹)v
0(b uH) ¡ ¸2 > 0 (2)









11The reduced program considers only the binding constraints at the optimum.
23Next, we characterize the threshold of exclusion for a lowrisk individual. This
threshold is given by the solution ®1 = 0 and b uH = U
H. When this is the
case, by construction b uNA
L = uNA
0 and b uA
L = uA
0 . After some manipulations
of (2), we obtain the threshold










If ¹ > b ¹ then ®1 = 0 and b uH > U
H. Also uNA
0 > b uNA




L: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem and di¤erentiating the
…rst-order conditions with respect to ¹; it is straightforward to verify that
the utilities b uA
L and b uH are increasing functions of ¹
Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2











False report D u
Report
In our setting, a contract C has the following shape
C =
n
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24and the expected utilities
Uj(C) ¸ Uj (4)
We also impose that an insured that is not audited must obtain the same
utility than an insured that has been audited and the audit has con…rmed
his announcement.
Therefore, for any type j 2 fL;Hg, two potential reporting behavior e j(j)
may arise as a response to the contract C o¤ered by the insurer. Either the


















0 6= j (5)


















0 6= j (6)
Proof of Lemma 1
We will show that a contract setting °e j > 0 and uD
e j > uA
e j ¸ u cannot
be an e¢cient one: Assume …rst that the type j misreports. Therefore, the
insurer’s expected pro…t depends on the reporting behavior of type j0: If type
j0 misreports, this pro…t is
I E
j ¦ = pj
h
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25where pj is the probability of facing a type j. On the other hand, if type j0






























For any strictly positive value of °
j0 and any strictly positive slack between
uD
j0 and uA
j0 , the insurer can always slightly decrease °
j0 by d°
j0 < 0 and
uD
j0 by duD
j0 < 0 such that both reporting behavior remain unchanged and
all constraints in (3) and (4) hold. Applying these modi…cations in (7) and
(8);the insurer’s expected pro…t increases: Therefore a contract like the initial
one cannot be e¢cient. The same reasoning applies when, no matter the
reporting behavior of type j0 6= j; the type j reports truthfully
Proof of Proposition 2
We will show that any couple of contracts that induce one type of agent or
both types to misreport is strongly dominated, in the sense of the insurer’s
expected pro…t, by a truthful revealing one. Take an arbitrary couple of
contracts
C =

















e j ¸ uD
e j ; all utilities verify (3) and, the expected utilities Uj; (4):
Three di¤erent cases of reporting behavior e j(j) may arise as a response to C.
² Case 1: e j(L) = H and e j(H) = L
When both types misreport, their corresponding expected utilities ver-
ify
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The insurer can o¤er a new couple of contracts
C
0=


















Take j = L: If e j(L) = L









> (1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼LuA
L from (9)
¸ (1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼L(°
LuD
L + (1 ¡ °
L)uA
L) from Lemma 1
= UHL(C0) the expected utility after a misreport e j(L) = H
As, facing the initial couple of contracts C, the expected utility veri…ed
the individual rationality constraint, this is also the case here. So
…nally, e j(L) = L. Next take j = H: If e j(H) = H









> (1 ¡ ¼H)uNA
H + ¼HuA
H from (10)
¸ (1 ¡ ¼H)uNA
H + ¼H(°
HuD
H + (1 ¡ °
H)uA
H) from Lemma 1
= ULH(C0) the expected utility after a misreport e j(H) = L
The same comment applies here concerning the type H individual ra-
27tionality constraint. So e j(H) = H: This new couple of contracts C0

























j ¦(C) because the function v is strictly convex.
Therefore the insurer strictly prefers to o¤er the new couple of contracts
C0:
² Case 2: e j(L) = L and e j(H) = L
When only a high risk agent misreports, the expected utilities now
verify
UL(C) = (1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼LuA
L
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H = UH(C) ¸ U
H
(13)
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The insurer can o¤er the new couple of contracts
C
0=

















28where ² > 0: Take j = L: If e j(L) = L
UL(C0) = (1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼LuA
L
¸ (1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼L(°
LuD
L + (1 ¡ °
L)uA
L) from Lemma 1
= UHL(C0) the expected utility after a misreport e j(L) = H
So …nally e j(L) = L because UL(C0) ¸ U
L. Next take j = H: If e j(H) =
H


















= ULH(C0) the expected utility after a misreport e j(H) = L
so e j(H) = H because ULH(C) ¸ U
H: This new couple of contracts C0
induces truthful reporting of both types. The insurer’s expected pro…t
is now
I E
j ¦(C0) = ¹
£
! ¡ ¼L` ¡ (1 ¡ ¼L)v(uNA






















j ¦(C) because the function v is strictly convex.
Again the insurer strictly prefers to o¤er the new couple of contracts
C0:
² Case 3: e j(L) = H and e j(H) = H
When only a low risk agent misreports, the proof is similar to the
previous one.
Therefore, for any arbitrary couple of contracts that induces a misreport,
the insurer strictly prefers to o¤er a truthful revealing couple of contracts.
29Proof of Lemma 2
An incentive compatible contract must verify




j0 + (1 ¡ °j0)u
A
j0]
Assume an e¢cient contract where uD
j0 > u: The insurer can lower uD
j0 and
°j0 so as to maintain Uj0j constant. By doing so, the insurer’s expected pro…t
increases because the expected audit cost decreases. So the initial contract
could not be e¢cient
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that an e¢cient contract sets uNA
H > uA
H: The insurer can decrease
uNA
H and increase uA
H such that the policyholder’s expected utility UH is
una¤ected: By construction, the new couple of contracts veri…es all con-
straints and the insurer’s expected pro…t increases. Therefore the initial
contract could not be e¢cient
Proof of Lemma 4
To prove this lemma, we need the following intermediary result.
Lemma 7 If IC(L) binds then IC(H) is slack.




H = 0 or °
H > 0:
1) If °
H = 0; UL = uH and either °
L = 0 or °
L > 0: If °
L = 0, this is










by Lemma 1. So















Then uH = UL > ULH and therefore IC(H) is slack.
302) If °
H > 0, by Lemma 1 we have that











and ¼H > ¼L then UL > ULH so IC(H) is slack
So assume that IC(L) binds at the optimum. Then
UL = (1 ¡ ¼L°
H)uH + ¼L°
Hu
>From the previous lemma, 8°
H uH > U
H: Hence, we can decrease uH such
that IC(H) and IR(H) remain and IC(L) becomes slack. As the contract
for the low risk is unchanged, IR(L) remains. The incentive properties of
the initial contract remain but the insurer’s expected pro…t increases. Hence
the initial contract could not be e¢cient. So IC(L) must be slack at the
optimum¥
Next, assume that an e¢cient contract sets °
H > 0. As IC(L) is slack,
then
UL > (1 ¡ ¼L°
H)uH + ¼L°
Hu
Then, the insurer can slightly decrease °
H such that IC(L) remains slack.
By construction, the new contract veri…es all constraints but the insurer’s
expected pro…t increases. Then °
H > 0 cannot be optimal¥
Finally, let an e¢cient contract yielding to IC(H) slack. Then, either
°
L > 0 or °
L = 0:
1. if °
L = 0 it is the Stiglitz framework. So IC(H) binds with equality,
which is a contradiction.
2. so °
L > 0: Then the insurer can decrease °
L and by doing so increase
ULH but such that IC(H) remains slack. By construction, the new con-
tract veri…es all constraints and the insurer’s expected pro…t increases.
Then an e¢cient contract could not verify IC(H) slack
Proof of Lemma 5
Assume that IR(L) is slack at the optimum. The insurer can slightly decrease
uNA
L and uA
L. In that case, duNA
L and duA
L can be found such that IC(L) and
31IR(L) are still slack and IC(H) holds. But therefore it is straightforward to
verify that the insurer’s expected pro…t increases. Hence an e¢cient contract
can not set IR(L) slack
Proof of Lemma 6
Assume that NOI(L) binds and °
L < ¿ ´
4¼
¼H(1¡¼L) in equilibrium. The
insurer can slightly increase uNA
L and decrease uA
L such that IR(L) still holds.
Applying this changes, the right hand side of IC(H) becomes
(1 ¡ ¼H)du
NA




Assume that IR(H) binds. In order to maintain the equality in IC(H); the













L < ¿ and duA
L < 0;d°
L < 0. By doing that changes the insurer’s
expected pro…t increases. Hence an e¢cient contract can not be like this. The
intuition follows identically if we assume IR(H) slack. The same proof also
holds if we assume an e¢cient contract setting NOI(L) slack and °
L ¸ ¿
The e¢cient contracts
In order to completely characterize the contracts o¤ered by the insurer, we
proceed in two steps. First of all, we obtain all possible types of e¢cient
contracts. Next we show, in the (u;¹) space, the parametric regions where
each type of contract dominates. Recall that we have restricted u to verify
u · b uA
L:
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where ¸1 and ¸2 are the (strictly positive) multipliers associated to the equal-
ity constraints and ®1 and ®2; to the inequality ones.12 The system of …rst
12We know that ¸1 and ¸2 are strictly positive because they are in fact Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers associated to inequalities that bind at the optimum.
33order conditions is the following :
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= 0 ®1 ¸ 0 CSC(1)
®2°
L= 0 ®2 ¸ 0 CSC(2)
We may have, as a solution of S1, the Stiglitz case (°
L = 0); characterized by
®2 > 0 and the corresponding system of …rst-order conditions. Then, when
the probability of audit is strictly positive, two solutions may arise.
Case A: uNA
L > uA
L and uH > U
H
>From the complementary-slackness conditions CSC(1) and CSC(2); ®1 =
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L and uH = U
H






> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
[(1¡ ¹)v0(U
H) ¡ ®1][4¼ ¡ ¼H°
L(1 ¡ ¼L)]
= ¹¼L(1 ¡ ¼L)[v0(uNA











H = (1 ¡ ¼H)uNA





L =(1 ¡ ¼L)uNA
L + ¼LuA
L
The frontiers of the parametric regions
We have to characterize the regions, in the (u;¹) space, where each of the
possible solutions are in fact optimal to implement. First we draw the locus
of pairs (u;¹) that characterize the Stiglitz case. This particular solution to
our problem is in fact described by the kinky curve u = b uA
L(¹).
The frontier between the cases A and B can be derived from one particular
solution to SB
1 ; namely when ®1 = 0: This solution gives, in addition to the
control variables of the problem, a locus e ¹(u) where the pairs of parameters
(u;¹) must lye on. When °
L > 0; it is necessary that u · uA
0 : Given that,





L = 0 and lim
u!uA
0
¹ = b ¹
Moreover, we …nd that
lim
u!¡1 °





















H) + ¼L [v0(uNA
0 ) ¡ v0(uA
0 )]
> 0
The last step to visualize the shape of the locus e ¹(u) is to see that
de ¹(u)
du











35We denote by (u)Min the value of u that veri…es this equality: The value of
¹ that solves the equation
¹ = e ¹((u)Min)





(e ¹)Min < b ¹
Proof of Proposition 3
Existence of a local maximum of a high risk agent’s expected utility
We have to…nd ifthere exists an optimal level ofu for a high risk policyholder.
In order to do that, we compute the partial derivative of uH with respect to
u when the Case A holds: To do that, we di¤erentiate the system of …rst-
order conditions SA
1 with respect to u and we apply the Implicit Function
Theorem. We obtain the system
S2 =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
¹[¼Lv00(uNA




@u ¡ (1 ¡ ¼L)
¼H





















































36where the numerator N is equal to





L ¡ u)(1 ¡ ¹)v0(uH)
¡¼2




and the denominator D is equal to
[¼H(1 ¡ ¼L)(1 ¡ ¹)v0(uH)]2
¡¹2¼2





















We can have some information about the sign of this derivative. First of all,


































0 and uH < U























then the denominator D is always strictly negative.
37On one side, we know that the Case B is the left limit of the Case A when
¹ ¸ b ¹. So when (u;¹) ! e ¹(u);
@uH
@u > 0: On the other side, when u increases















Although the sign of this expression is not straightforward; we can show
another su¢cient condition so that it is always negative. Let’s restrict our












v0(b uH)2 is increasing in ¹ because
db uH
d¹ > 0: Moreover
¹
(1¡¹)



























@u < 0: Therefore, as D is also always negative, for any
¹ > b ¹, there exists at least a value of u such that N = 0 and
@uH
@u = 0. So
uH has at least one local maximum denoted by u¤
H. This particular value of
u depends on all the parameters of the model
Uniqueness of the local maximum
We have to prove some intermediary results
Lemma 8 When N = 0; °
L and uA





L(1 ¡ ¼L)] = ¹¼L(1 ¡ ¼L)[v
0(u
NA






L) = ¼H(1 ¡ ¹)v
0(uH)(u
A




L)¤ and (uH)¤ the values taken by the utilities when
N = 0: Lets analyze the impact of an in…nitesimal change ² > 0 of u: From
the fact that N = 0; the resulting changes in uH can be neglected at a
…rst-order.












As the function c(°
L) is positive and monotonic, the function (c0)¡1 is always
positive. Therefore °
L < (°
L)¤: Now plugging this result in (16), the left-






















L)¤ must decrease. This change re-enforces the negative change
in (°
L)¤
Lemma 9 When N = 0; the audit probability °
L is lower than ¿
2:





























Lemma 10 If ¯` < 2
3 ln
1¡¼L




Proof. The expression (1¡¼L)2v000(uA
L)¡(¼L)2v000(uNA














0 ) > 0














0 = 1 ¡ e¡¯! and uNA







is therefore immediate. When ` and ¼L are su¢ciently small, this condition
holds
The last step to prove the uniqueness of the maximum level of uH is to





















































> 0. As D is always negative,
@2uH
@u2 < 0 when N = 0: As at that point uH is strictly concave, the critical
point is a local maximum. So if there exists another critical point where
N = 0; it could not be a minimum. But as this is a necessary condition for
the existence of another local maximum, the value u¤ such that
@uH
@u = 0 is
unique and the maximum u¤
H is global. We conclude that, for each value of
¹; there exist an unique level u = u¤ such that the utility of a high risk agent
is maximal¥
Some comparative statics on u¤
We denote by u¤(¹) the locus of values u that maximize uH: We do some
comparative statics on u¤(¹): From SA
1 we can derive the following system
40denoted by S3
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
(1 ¡ ¹)v00(uH)[4¼ ¡ ¼H°
L(1 ¡ ¼L)]
@uH






¡(1 ¡ ¹)v0(uH)¼H(1 ¡ ¼L)
@°
L
@¹ = ¼L(1 ¡ ¼L)[v0(uNA







































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=u¤
= ¡




















L +24¼2: It is straight-
forward to verify that g(°
L) > 0 when °
L < ¿
2: As this is the case when





















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=u¤
= 0
When u = u¤; we write N in the following way



































Knowing that, it is straightforward to verify that
(u
¤(¹);¹) ! ((u)Min ;(e ¹)Min)
when ¹ decreases.











































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
u=u¤





































Welfare implications of u¤
We de…ne the social welfare as W ´ I E
j
¦ + ¹UL + (1 ¡ ¹)UH: This social
criterion is strictly concave in all its arguments. We know that UH is an u-
shaped function with respect to u: Moreover, as the feasible set of contracts
is reduced when u increases, I E
j
¦ decreases in that case. So it is immediate
to see that u¤ is not a maximum of W and by setting uW < u¤; the expected
welfare increases
42